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COMMENT
IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING WATER RIGHTS THROUGH
UNIFICATION-A CASE STUDY ON THE CONSOLIDATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS
INTRODUCTION AND SuMMARY OF EXISTING APPROPRIATIONS

I.

The North Platte River is a non-navigable stream' located in the arid region of the Great Plains, an area which
is heavily dependent on the waters of the river for its development and prosperity. The need for large scale irrigation
to develop the region was recognized, and the doctrine of prior
appropriation seemed most suited to the area.2 Hundreds of
rights to the water of the North Platte exist today with different priorities and sources. These include appropriative
rights to the use of the direct flow, to the storage of the direct
flow, and to the use of the storage water, as well as contract
rights to the use of the storage water. In addition, in Nebraska v. Wyoming,' the United States Supreme Court apportioned the water of the North Platte among Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado. "In Wyoming, the stream is a thread
upon which reservoirs are strung like beads. The Court decreed an intrastate priority among the reservoirs (which had
protected Nebraska since the earliest reservoir stored water
for Nebraska lands) ; an interstate priority between the res-

ervoirs in Wyoming and earlier diversion canals in Nebraska;
and a percentage division of the natural flow designed to give
effect to the priorities of the users in the latter two states.""
The objective of this study will be to determine the legal
possibilities, first, of consolidating capacities and water right
priorities of the North Platte and Kendrick Projects, and
second, of integrating the storage capacities and water right
priorities of the consolidated projects with the water right
priorities of the individual direct flow appropriators. For
the purposes of this study, it will be assumed that the owners
of the water rights will receive economic benefits derived
from the consolidations suggested above which will justify
the integration of the rights on the North Platte River.'
1.

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).

2.

TRELEASE, BLOOMENTHAL & GERAUD,
RESOURCES 2 (1965).

CASES AND

MATERIALS ON NATURAL

3. 325 U.S. 589 (1945), modified, 345 U.S. 981 (1953).
4. Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People,
States, and Nation, (1963 Sup. Ct. Rev. 158, 170).
5. A study of this point is presently being conducted by the Department of
Agricultural Economics, College of Agriculture, University of Wyoming,
Laramie, Wyoming.
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V

Water Right Doctrines As Applied in Wyoming
and Nebraska

The State of Wyoming applies the doctrine of prior appropriation exclusively. The Constitution of Wyoming,'
adopted in 1890, and the Wyoming Statutes7 provide for this
8 Wyoming
type of water right. In Moyer v. Preston,
adopted
'
the "Colorado doctrine" and held that the doctrine of riparian rights never did exist in Wyoming and that prior appropriation existed before there was any legislation on the
subject. Thus, there are no riparian rights in Wyoming.
The State of Nebraska has a dual system of water law.
Originally Nebraska followed the doctrine of riparian rights.
Even after the legislature had adopted an irrigation code
based on the principle of prior appropriation, the Supreme
Court, in Meng v. Coffee,"0 affirmed the existence of riparian rights in Nebraska.1 1 In 1895, the legislature adopted an
irrigation code modeled on the Wyoming irrigation code."2
The Act of 1895 forms the basis of the Nebraska water statutes today. In 1920, the Constitution of Nebraska1 8 recognized the doctrine of prior appropriation. Until 1966, the riparian rights in Nebraska were considered inferior to rights
of appropriators since a violation of riparian rights by appropriators would not be enjoined, only compensation being
awarded." It was thought that, "A riparian who desired to
protect his existing uses of the water that antedated appropriations was forced to comply with the irrigation laws and
claim as an appropriator, for otherwise his only right
against a later appropriator would be the collection of money
damages, and he would have no protection for his water at
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Wyo. CONST. art. 8, § 3.

WYo. STAT. §§ 41-2, -211, -212 (1957).
6 Wyo. 308, 44 Pac. 845 (1896).
The "Colorado doctrine" as announced in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.,
6 Colo. 443 (1882) is that riparian law is not suited to the climate and
geography of the state and that prior appropriation has been the sole
basis of the right to the use of water from the date of the earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries of the state.
67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903).
Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. Rav. 385 (1950).
Id. at 387.
NEB. CONST. art. 15, § 6.
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903); McCook
Irrigation & Water Power Co. v. Crews, 70 Neb. 115, 102 N.W. 249 (1905);
Cline v. Stock, 71 Neb. 70, 102 N.W. 265 (1905).
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But in the 1966 decision of Wasserburger v. Coffee,"6

all."

the Supreme Court of Nebraska overruled Crawford Company v. Hathaway'7 and granted to riparian owners an injunction enjoining upper irrigators against exhausting a
stream by diversions pursuant to appropriation permits from
the state. The full impact of this decision has not yet been
determined. However, any solutions offered later in regard
to appropriative rights in Nebraska would apply equally well
to existing riparian rights.
The procedures by which appropriative rights are obtained in Wyoming 8 and in Nebraska'" are very similar. An
application for a permit is filed with the proper state
agency."0 When the requirements are met and the permit issued, the date of priority for the water right relates back to
the date on which the application was made.' No appropriation is denied except when such denial is demanded by the
public interests."
B.

Development of Water Rights of the North Platte River

The first attempts to bring water to the land surrounding the North Platte River were made by individuals and
by private companies which operated canals and other irrigation works. In 1902, the private development of water resources was supplemented by the Reclamation Act2" which
provided for federal "construction and maintenance of irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of
waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands . . .
Section 8 of the act provides that it is not intended in any way
to interfere with the laws of any state relating to the control
or distribution of water, and that the Secretary of Interior
shall proceed in conformity with the state laws in carrying
out the provisions of the act.25 Until recently, this section
15. Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use
of Water, 33 TEXAs L. REv. 24, 61 (1954).
16. 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966).
17. 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).
18. Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-26, -27, -201 to -216 (1957).
19. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-233 to -243 (Reissue 1960).
20. Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-26, -201 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233, -241, -242
(Reissue 1960).
21. WYo. STAT. § 41-212 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-235 (Reissue 1960).
22. WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 3; NEB. CONST. art. 15, § 6.
23. 32 Stat. 388 (1902), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ S71-616 (1964).
24. Id. § 391.

25. Id.

883.
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was interpreted to mean that a Reclamation water right must
be obtained through an application for a permit to appropriate just as any private appropriator is required to do. Thus
viewed, national policy was deliberately subjected to the possibility of state control and even state veto.26 In accordance
with this interpretation of Section 8, the Bureau of Reclamation made application and received state storage permits
for all of its projects on the North Platte River. Since that
time, the United States Supreme Court has held that, " .. .§ 8
does not mean that state law may operate to prevent the IUnited States from exercising the power of eminent domain to
acquire the water rights of others .... Rather, the effect of
§ 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the definition of the
property interests, if any, for which compensation must be
made," 27 and that there is no room for state laws inconsistent with the undertakings of federal projects."8
The North Platte Project was the first application of
the Reclamation Act 29 to the waters of the North Platte River. Pathfinder Reservoir, with a priority date of December
6, 1904, is the principal storage facility for the project. Pathfinder has a storage capacity of just over 1,000,000 acre feet
and is located on the North Platte River southwest of Casper,
Wyoming. Guernsey Reservoir, a much smaller unit used to
supplement Pathfinder and to regulate the water, has a priority date of April 20, 1923. The reservoir is located upstream
from Guernsey, Wyoming and has a storage capacity of about
50,000 acre feet. The North Platte Project's ratio of storage
capacity to acres irrigated is approximately 3.4 to 1. Even
though the storage capacity of the North Platte Project is
located in Wyoming, most of the land benefited by the project is in Nebraska. The law of prior appropriation requires
that the project observe the priority of all senior appropriators located below its storage facilities on the North Platte
River. These senior appropriators include thirty-two canals
in Wyoming in addition to the State Line Canals in Nebraska. The North Platte Project can only store water that is in
26. Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 RocKy MT. L. REv. 464, 467 (1960).
27. City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 630 (1963).
28. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See part IV infra p. 359 for
further discussion of § 8.
29. 32 Stat. 388 (1902).
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excess of the 'demand made on the water by the senior appropriators."
In 1931, the Bureau of Reclamation started the Kendrick Project for the irrigation of land in central Wyoming.
The principal storage facility for the project is Seminoe
Reservoir which has a priority date of December 1, 1931. The
reservoir is located above Pathfinder and has a storage capacity of just over 1,000,000 acre feet. Alcova Reservoir, with
a priority date of April 25, 1936, gives the project additional
storage and serves as the point of diversion for the project's
main canal. Alcova has a storage capacity of almost 200,000
acre feet and is located below Pathfinder. The Ken'drick Project's ratio of storage capacity to acres irrigated is approximately 52 to 1. With minor exceptions, all of the appropriations from the North Platte River are senior to the appropriations held by the Kendrick Project."1
It should be noted that, although the storage capacities
of the two projects are approximately the same, the North
Platte Project provides for about fourteen times as much land
as does the Kendrick Project. The combined storage capacity
of the two projects is 175 percent of the long-time average annual run-off of the North Platte River at Pathfinder.
In 1911, the Warren Act 2 authorized the Secretary of
Interior to utilize the storage or carrying capacity of the
federal facilities that is in excess of project needs by contracting with irrigation systems operating under the Carey
Act, 3 and with individuals, corporations, associations, and
irrigation districts organized for or engaged in furnishing or
in distributing water for irrigation. This legislation allowed
non-project lands to participate in the summer irrigation
made possible by the project storage facilities. Many irrigation companies in Wyoming and Nebraska take advantage
of the excess project water.
The Flood Control Act of 1944"4 was enacted by Congress
30. United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation; Annual
Project History, North Platte Project, Wyoming-Nebraska, Volumes 45-53
(1957-1965).
31. United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation; Annual
Project History, Kendrick Project, Volumes 24-33 (1956-1965).
32. 36 Stat. 925 (1911), 43 U.S.C. § 523 (1964).
33. 28 Stat. 422 (1894), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 641 (1964).
34. 58 Stat. 887 (1944), 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-709a (1964).
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to construct public works on rivers and harbors for flood
control and for other purposes (including irrigation). The
Missouri River Basin Project 8 was undertaken as a part of
the Flood Control Act. The first reservoir built under the
project was Kortes Reservoir. It is situated between Seminoe and Pathfinder and has a storage capacity of 4,800 acre
feet. In 1954, Congress passed a resolution" providing for
the construction of Glendo Reservoir above Guernsey, with
a capacity7 of 40,000 acre feet and a priority 'date of August
30, 1950.
The North Platte Project, with its early priority, can
normally store water every year. But its low ratio of storage
capacity to acres irrigated means that in normal years the
project uses most of the water stored in its reservoirs. There
is little or virtually no active carryover following a dry year,
and this results in a water supply for practical purposes, on
a year-to-year basis during dry years. The Kendrick Project situation is the opposite of that in the North Platte Project. Because of its late priority, the number of years in which
Kendrick has been unable to store any water is almost equal
to the number of years in which it has been able to store water. But the project's storage capacity is so great in comparison to the amount of land irrigated that in can store
enough water in a good year to carry it through several dry
years.8"
Because of these differences in the advantages and 'disadvantages of the two projects, a consolidation of the water
rights of the North Platte and Kendrick Projects would result not only in the elimination of many of the administrative problems, but also in the more efficient and beneficial
use of the river's water. In good years, the North Platte Project would be able to take advantage of the large storage capacity of the Kendrick Project to store its water. In dry
years, the North Platte Project could 'depend on the large excess accrual in Seminoe to meet the project's needs. It is
possible that after a series of dry years the large storage ca35. Id. § 10, at 897.
36. 68 Stat. 486 (1954).
37. Permit 5998 Res., State Engineer's Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming, filed Aug.
30, 1950, approved as amended, Mar. 4, 1953. See part IV, infra p. 359
for further discussion of the Glendo Dam.
38. Telephone interview with Mr. Pete Anker, Chief, Irrigation, North Platte
Project Office, Casper, Wyoming, Mar. 31, 1967, and Apr. 14, 1967.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss2/4

6

MacPherson et al.: Improvement of Exisiting Water Rights through Unification - A Cas

COM[MENT

1967

333

pacity of Seminoe would be exhausted and storage water
would not be available to meet the needs of the Kendrick
Project. In such years, the North Platte Project's water,
with its early priority to direct flow, could be used to supply
the Kendrick Project's needs. Of course, the complete integration of all of the water rights on the North Platte River
would offer the most efficient administration anid use of the
water. Such a consolidation would include all individual direct flow and contract rights as well as the storage rights of
all the Bureau of Reclamation projects. This would allow water with an early priority under an individual person's water right to be stored in the federal reservoirs. Water would
be delivered to users when they need it, and no water would
be wasted. The individuals with early prior appropriations
would be benefited by the availability of storage water for irrigation in the summer instead of being limited to the direct
flow which is very heavy in the spring and which tapers drastically during the summer.
II.

SOLUUONS UNDER ExISTING LAW

A.

Wyoming Law

One way to consolidate the federal reservoirs and their
supporting projects is simply to change the water rights
around, in effect, changing the relationships of the various
parties involved. If this were done the Bureau could store direct flow which is presently allowed to pass by. If necessary,
Seminoe water could be given to North Platte Project users
in years of shortage, and Pathfinder water could be given
to Kendrick Project users in years of surplus. All of this
could be done by transferring water rights. However, the
Wyoming water right transfer restriction raises certain difficulties.
Early in the history of water law in the State of Wyoming, the right which an individual held could be transferred freely. 9 This was generally the law in all prior appropriation states.40 But, in 1909, Wyoming enacted a statute
39. Johnston v. Little Horse Creek Irrigating Co., 13 Wyo. 208, 79 Pac. 22
(1904).

40. Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-Case Studies in the Transfer of
Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. R v. 1, 21 (1966)
Trelease & Lee].
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which provided: "Water rights cannot be detached from
the lands, place or purpose for which they are acquired,
without loss of priority." 4 ' Part of the history of water law
in Wyoming has been the gradual legislative erosion of this
statute.4 2
For the purposes of this comment, only certain exceptions to the general rule will be considered.4 " One amendment to the original statute restricted its ban to "Water rights
for the direct use of the natural unstored flow of any
stream .. .,"" and companion statutes were enacted."5 Since
the statutory restriction applies only to "natural unstored
flow," storage rights are not restricted in their transferability.
Storage rights such as the Bureau of Reclamation has
for its dams along the Platte River are generally regulated
by Sections 41-26 through 41-46 of the Wyoming Statutes.
LandThe builder of a dam obtains a primary permit."
owners who exhibit to the State Engineer an agreement between them and the reservoir owner giving "a permanent
and sufficient interest in said reservoir to impound enough
water for the purposes set forth . . ."" may apply for a secondary permit to put the water to a beneficial use."5 This secondary permit has been described as one to 'appropriate'
the stored water to particular lands." 4 9 It may be transferred
freely since it is a right to the stored waters of the reservoir and not "for the direct use of the natural unstored flow
of any stream." The Bureau of Reclamation took out secondary permits in the names of the landowners within the
41. Wyo. Laws 1909, ch. 68, § 1.
42. See Trelease & Lee for a description and discussion of this history.
43. Trelease & Lee at 11-19 list 10 exceptions to the 1909 statute as originally
passed. These are: 1) Domestic and Transportation Purposes, 2) Pre-1909
Rights, 3) Rotation, 4) Reservoir Rights, 5) Amendment of Permits, 6)
Agreements Between Appropriators, 7) Submerged Lands, 8) Steam Power
Plants, 9) Industrial Uses, and 10) Highway Purposes. Those which apply
to the problem presented in this comment, numbers 2, 4, 5 and 6, will be
discussed in the body of the comment.
44. WYo. STATS. § 41-2 (1957).
45. WYO. STATS. §§ 41-34, -37 (1957).
46. WYo. STATS. § 41-26 (1957). This section sets forth the procedure for
obtaining such a permit.
47. WYo. STATS. § 41-27 (1957).
48. Ibid.
49. Trelease & Lee at 46-47.
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areas of their various projects at the time the works were
completed."
1. Unification Absent the Creation of New Governmental Entities. The secondary permit appropriators present the principal problem in that they have 'direct claims on
the reservoirs. Each of the permits names as its source a reservoir and is a claim only against water stored under that reservoir's priority. 1 The holder has a property right which
can be transferred at the "use" end. However, it is frozen at
the "source" end of the right. As a result, the Bureau must
furnish to a North Platte Project landowner water under the
Pathfinder reservoir's priority in accordance with the decision in Ickes v. Fox.
Since these uses are not regulated by the general rule
against transfers, it would seem that with the acquiescence of
those who presently have secondary permits, the Bureau
could at least solve the problem of having to serve them from
specific reservoirs. This would conceivably be done in one
of the following manners."
One solution would be to have all the secondary permit
holders cancel their permits in exchange for contracts which
named either of the reservoirs as a source of their right. This,
however, would involve giving up property rights on the part
of those with secondary permits, and it is possible that they
54
would not want to give these up for a mere contract right.
50. Trelease & Lee at 47. Interview with Dean Frank J. Trelease, University of
Wyoming College of Law, Laramie, Wyoming, January, 1967.
51. WYO. STATS. § 41-27 (1957).
52. 300 U.S. 82 (1936). The Fox case held that the landowners had a property
right, not a contract right, in light of the Reclamation Act of 1902, Washington State law, and the contracts between the Secretary of the Interior
(through the Bureau of Reclamation) and the Water Users Association,
which distributed the water to the individual landowners. See also Nebraska
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 611-16 (1944) which stated, in passing, that the
rights were in the landowners.
53. All of the proposed solutions would require a renegotiation of the present
repayment contracts which the Bureau has with the Irrigation Districts
that serve as the carriers to the landowners. See, for example, paragraphs
16 and 21 of the "Casper-Alcova Irrigation District Contract" 71 Stat.
608, September 4, 1957 and executed November 22, 1957, on file at the
Office of the Bureau of Reclamation in Casper, Wyoming.
54. Particularly in view of the difficulties encountered by the landowners in
Ickes v. Fox, supra note 52, where if the right had been determined to have
been the government's, the landowner's claims would have been merely
contractual, and they would have encountered the "governmental immunity"
doctrine and all the ensuing remedial difficulties presented thereby.
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A second approach would be simply to have all the permits amended to name both reservoirs as the source of the
water put to beneficial use under the permits. The Wyoming
Statutes provide that the board of control can amend permits, "when in the judgment of the . . . Board it appears
desirable or necessary.'5 While this statute requires that the
petitioner for the amendment must be the owner of all the
lands involved in the petition, it would not seem to be possible
to meet the requirement. Each individual holder of a secondary permit could apply for such an amendment, and since the
only lands involved in each petition would be those owned by
the petitioner, the requirement would seem to be met.
Another procedure through which the Bureau could unify it projects would be to have all the holders of secondary
permits transfer them to the Bureau of Reclamation. Then,
the Bureau, as owner of all the rights could cancel the secondary permits, at which time, new agreements between the
Bureau and the landowners could be reached and new secondary permits taken out naming both reservoirs as the source
of the water.
Should the Bureau be able to effect such a change in
the secondary permits, the secondary permit holders in both
projects would have permits calling for water from either reservoir, and the local Director of the Bureau could meet their
requirements from whichever source was best able to bear
the diversion. Because the Bureau would hold all priorities,
it is unlikely that the United States would raise objections
against its own actions in simply thereafter treating the two
reservoir rights as interchangeable. Since the water would
continue to be accumulated in the reservoirs in accordance
with their original priorities, there should be no objections
from other appropriators.
The direct flow appropriators on the Platte present another problem, in that the Bureau must let their water go by
and is unable to store it. If the Bureau were able to store the
water and provide it to the landowner as he needed it, there
would seem to be a more beneficial use of the water with less
waste and inefficiency for all concerned. The simplest pos55.

§ 41-213 (Supp. 1965). This is one of the ten exceptions listed
by Trelease & Lee. See Trelease & Lee, 13-15, 51-55 for a discussion of
the exception and examples of its application.
WYO. STAT.
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sible solution to this problem would be to have the federal
government purchase these rights."
Another way in which to solve this problem might be by
use of the "exchange" statuteI found in the Wyoming Statutes. This statute provides that appropriators may agree
among themselves "for the delivery and use of either storage or direct flow water from another source."' This can be
done "where either (a) the source of the appropriation is at
times insufficient to fully satisfy such appropriation, or (b)
a fuller conservation and utilization of the state's water resources can be resultantly accomplished.I 5 Although this
statute was specifically designed for a special case which
arose in the Owl Creek Reclamation Project,"0 it appears to
be general enough to bear this application. The only 'difficulty
which might arise is a determination of what the words "from
another source" mean. No case seems to have interpreted this
particular phrase, and it appears susceptible to various meanings."' Here, although, in one sense, the source is the same
(the North Platte River), in another sense, it is different
(change from direct flow right to storage right). There seems
to be no good reason why the more liberal interpretation
should not be accepted, particularly in light of the fact that
to do so would result in a fuller conservation and utilization
of the state's water resources.
Thus the problems of administering the waters in the
North Platte River can be met through existing Wyoming
law, simply on a person to person basis between the Bureau
of Reclamation and the individual landowner.
56. This could be done under § 7 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 389,
43 U.S.C. § 421 (1964), which gives the Secretary of the Interior authorization to acquire rights of property necessary to the carrying out of the
provisions of the Act. Such acquisitions can be by either purchase or
condemnation. For a further discussion of this power see part IV of this
comment, infra p. 359. Since the companion decisions of Dugan v. Rank,
372 U.S. 609 (1963) and City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963),
the Secretary is not bound by state laws when obtaining rights necessary
to the administration of a project, there is probably an eleventh exception
to be added to Trelease & Lee's ten exceptions to the Wyoming "no-change"
statute.
57. WYo. STATS. § 41-5 (1957).
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Trelease & Lee at 16.
61. For one possible meaning, see Trelease & Lee's discussion of the Wheatland
Irrigation District's consideration of the use of this statute beginning at
1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 57 (1966). The Act providing for the creation,
powers and administration of such districts is contained in sections 41-77
through 41-117 of the Wyoming Statutes.
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Unification Based on the Creation of New Govern-

mental Entities. The system created under Wyoming law

absent new governmental entities would still be somewhat
fragmentary and probably would not solve all the problems
which exist, particularly the problems created by those who
might not wish to participate. It would seem to be a better solution to the problem simply to run the entire river basin as
a single entity, for the benefit of all persons having interests
therein. Under existing Wyoming law, there is an approach
whereby such a desired goal could be achieved.
Wyoming law provides for the establishment of conservancy districts which can be clothed with fairly extensive
powers.2 Such a district is set up to administer the waters
within the area which it serves. In effect, it can be characterized as a special district or a quasi-municipal district.
To create such a district, petition must be made to a court
within the proposed district's boundaries. This petition requires signatures of:
not fewer than twenty-five percent (25%) of the
owners or entrymen on having not less than twentyfive percent (25%) of the irrigated lands or lands
susceptible of irrigation under the works proposed
for construction, to be included in the district, but
not embraced within the incorporated limits of a city
or town... and be also signed by not fewer than five

percent (5%) of non-irrigated land and/or lands embraced in the incorporated limits of a city or town,
all situated in the proposed district."
The statute also requires that such tracts of land represented
must have a valuation of at least one hundred dollars. 4 If
the petitions are in order, the court will give notice to all the
persons within the proposed district who are concerned and
to all county commissioners of counties which will be within
the district's boundaries. 5 Opponents may also petition the
district court to prevent the district's creation.6 If this petition has the names of those owning twenty percent of the
irrigable land within the proposed district and the names
62.
68.
64.
65.
66.

Wyo.

STATS. § 41-83 (1957).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Wyo. STATS. § 41-85 (1957).
Wyo. STATS. § 41-86 (1957).
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of those owning at least five percent of the non-irrigable land
embraced within the limits of an incorporated city or town
within the district, the establishment of the requested district must automatically be rejected.6 7
If such a district is created, included within its powers
is the authority to obtain water rights within its boundaries,
to build distribution facilities, and to sell water from the
rights which it has obtained. 8 Were such a district established, it is possible that every water right on the Platte River
67. Ibid.
68. WYO. STATS. § 41-91 (1957). Section 41-89 provides for the initial appointment and later election of a Board of Directors for the district. Then,
section 41-91 provides:
The board shall have power on behalf of said districts:
(b) Purchase, etc. of property and water rights, etc.-To take by
appropriation, grant, purchase, bequest, devise or lease, and to hold
and enjoy water, water works, water rights and sources of water
supply; and any and all real and personal property of any kind
within or without the district necessary or convenient to the full
exercise of its powers; and to sell, lease, encumber, alien or otherwise
dispose of water, water works, water rights and sources of water
supply for use within the district, and any and all real and personal
property of any kind within or without the district; also to acquire,
construct or operate, control and use any and all works, facilities and
means necessary or convenient to the exercise of its power, both within
and without the district for the purpose of providing for the use of
such water within the district and to do and perform any and all
things necessary or convenient to the full exercise of the power herein
granted ....

(c) Eminent domain.-To have and to exercise the power of
eminent domain and in the manner provided by law for the condemnation of private property for public use to take any property necessary
to the exercise of the powers herein granted.
(e) Contracts with federal government, etc.-To contract with the
government of the United States or any agency thereof or with an
agency of the State of Wyoming for the construction, preservation,
operation and maintenance of water supply works, drains, pipelines,
tunnels, reservoirs, regulating basins, diversion canals and works, dams,
power plants and all necessary works incidental thereto, including
supply canals, farm laterals, and distribution and drainage systems
of all kinds, and to acquire perpetual rights to the use of water from
such works, to sell and dispose of perpetual rights to the use of water
from such works to persons and corporations, public and private.
(f) Allocation of district water to irrigated lands, etc.-To list
in separate ownership the lands within the district which are susceptible
of irrigation from district sources and to make an allotment of water
to all such lands .
. .; to levy assessments as hereinafter provided,
against the lands within the district to which water is allotted . . .;
provided that the board may divide the district into units and fix a
different value per acre-foot of water in the respective units, with
due regard to land classification, and in such cases shall assess the
lands within each unit upon the same basis of value per acre-foot
of water allotted to land within such unit.
(g) Fixing of water rates.-To fix rates at which water not
allotted to lands as hereinbefore provided shall be sold, leased or
otherwise disposed of; provided, however, that rates shall be equitable
although not necessarily equal or uniform, for like classes of service
throughout the district ....
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and its tributaries could be acquired. The district could then
sell water to those who desire it.
The problems presented by the direct flow appropriators and the secondary permit holders have been discussed.
The merits of the conservancy district approach must be
viewed in the light of these problems. 9
Those appropriators who have direct flow rights which
predate the 1909 "no-change" statute could sell their rights
to the district for consideration of a long term contract assuring them a water supply. Of course those who wished to
do so could simply sell their interests outright. Under the
decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court, the district could
change its purchased direct flow rights to storage rights if
it was necessary for greater beneficial use."'
Considering the language of the "no-change" statute,
some question may arise as to whether a pre-1909 appropriation could be transferred. Although the question has never
been presented to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming has held
that pre-1909 rights in Wyoming are freely alienable.71 Should
the question ever be presented to the Wyoming Court, it is
probable that the United States Supreme Court would have
the last word since the 'decision of the District Court was
69. But see Trelease, Transfer of Water Rights-Errata and Addenda-Sales
for Recreational Purposes and to Districts, 2 LAND & WATER L. REv.
321 (1967). If the view presented in Dean Trelease's article is correct, then
the "no-change" problems may not exist. This comment was written on the
assumption that the law is as presented in Trelease & Lee, Priority and
Progress-CaseStudies in the Transfer of Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 1 (1966). Dean Trelease's article should be examined and the rest
of this comment read in light of it, for it may well be possible that the
difficulties do not exist.
70. Holt v. City of Cheyenne, 22 Wyo. 212, 137 Pac. 876 (1913). The Holt case
is susceptible to this reading, although it did not say this in so many
words. In Holt, a water user had brought an action against the City of
Cheyenne to recover damages for the City's alleged unlawful use of water
from Crow Creek. Among the plaintiff's many grounds for relief was
that the city had built dams higher up on the creek and stopped the flow.
The plaintiff urged that a change in diversion could not be made (this
seemed to mean a change from a direct flow diversion below plaintiff's
land to a storage diversion above the plaintiff's land). However, the
court said a change in diversion was recognized by Johnston v. Little Horse
Irrigating Co., supra note 39. It was determined that plaintiff was precluded from asserting any injuries, chiefly because Cheyenne's appropriation was prior to plaintiff's and because the City was within the limits
of its priority. 22 Wyo., at 229-232. Trelease & Lee also present an
administrative situation where a change from a direct flow appropriation
to a storage appropriation was allowed. See the case history discussion
of the Industrial Use exception to the Wyoming "no-change" statute at
1 LAND & WATER L. Ruv. 64-66 (1966).
71. Hughes v. Lincoln Land Co., 27 F. Supp. 972 (D. Wyo. 1939).
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based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the Wyoming Court would follow the
reasoning of the Federal Court decision."
Although the question is beyond the scope of this comment, a collateral consideration isthe possible problem which
might arise as a result of the "160 acre limitation" of the
Federal Reclamation law.7"
Individuals who have direct flow rights which were acquired subsequent to the passage of the 1909 statute present
a slightly more complex problem. If they fit within one of the
other exceptions to the 1909 statute,74 they could then transfer their rights to the district. The most likely exceptions to
be used in this context are the reservoir exception and the
"exchange" statute exception.
The reservoir exception to the 1909 statute allows those
who hold storage rights to transfer them freely.75 Thus, any
appropriator of this type wishing to transfer his rights to the
district could do so and no problem would seem to occur.
Other direct flow appropriators could exchange their
rights with the district under the procedure set out in the
"exchange" statute previously mentioned.' In return they
would receive waters from the district from whatever sources
the district cared to call upon to furnish the requirement. The
agreement providing for such an exchange would be on file
with the state engineer's office"7 and would protect both parties. Thus, the direct flow rights of individual appropriators
in the Platte Basin within the State of Wyoming could be obtained by the district and such waters could then be administered and distributed by it.
72. Trelease & Lee state that four Wyoming Attorneys General have ren .ted
opinions which follow the Hughes reasoning. Trelease & Lee at 12. The
authors also present case studies of where transfers of pre-1909 rights
have been approved administratively by the State Engineer and Board of
Control. Id. at 64-66.
73. Reclamation Act of 1902, § 5, 32 Stat. 389, 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1964). For a
discussion of the considerations relating to the "160-acre limitation" in
the Central Valley Project in California, see Graham, The Central Valley
Project: Resource Development of a Natural Basin, 38 CALiF. L. REv. 588
at 603-619 (1950).
74. See note 43, supra.
75. See note 44, supra and accompanying text.
76. Wyo. STATS. § 41-5 (1957). See also note 57, supra and accompanying text.
77. As required by Wyo. STATS. § 41-7 (1957).
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As for those appropriators within the district who have
secondary permits, the district could obtain them for the consideration of a long term contract or lease to provide those
individuals with their water." Then, the district would own
the rights and would have contract requirements to fulfill as
to them. Since the district would own the right, delivery of
the waters from the various reservoirs would be to the district and it would distribute them.
Thus, under present Wyoming law, a district could be
created which would permit the acquisition of all water rights
along the Platte within the State of Wyoming. This district
would then be able to distribute such waters on a contract basis, in somewhat the same manner as a city water works distributes water to its users. As a result, water users along the
Platte would be receiving their water in the same way as city
water users, not caring where they obtained it, but merely
being concerned with whether it showed up in their taps or
their headgates, as the case may be, when they wanted it.
B.

Nebraska Law

Prior to 1895, an appropriative right in Nebraska was
not attached to specific land and could be transferred or assigned.7" However, in 1895, the Nebraska legislature enacted
78. This presents some difficulties. Although the law seems fairly clear that
secondary permit rights are freely transferable, the repayment contracts
which the Bureau has with the irrigation districts which act as carriers
between the United States and the landowners probably preclude this
type of change. (See, for example, paragraph 16 of the "Casper-Alcova
Irrigation District Contract," 71 Stat. 608 (1957), executed on November 22, 1957, on file at the Office of the Bureau of Reclamation in Casper,
Wyoming.) However, renegotiation of the contracts and subsequent approval by Congress should not be too difficult since the solutions presented
here are desirable to the Bureau of Reclamation as well as to the landowners. Indeed, a similar trade has taken place in Colorado. There "11
existing ditch systems in the project service area assigned to the [purgatoire
River Water] Conservancy District their direct flow rights for the mutual
benefit of all lands in the Conservancy District." Letter from Edward J.
Talbot, Chief, Repayments Branch, Bureau of Reclamation, Regional
Office, Region 7, Denver, Colorado to Dean Frank J. Trelease, College
of Law, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, March 28, 1967. The
letter, enclosed contract, Operating Criteria and Operating Principles
indicate a plan for transferring certain storage rights from an existing
dam to a proposed one, assigning the direct flow rights as indicated above,
and the renegotiation of a contract between the Purgatoire River Water
Conservancy District and the Bureau. Other details, in addition to those
listed, were the end result of three years of "intensive effort" on the
part of all concerned in solving the problems of negotiation.
79. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation Co. v. Gothenburg Water Power & Irrigation Co., 73 Neb. 223, 102 N.W. 487 (1905); Vonburg v. Farmers Irrigation District, 132 Neb. 12, 270 N.W. 835 (1937); United States v. Tilley,
124 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1941).
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an irrigation code which stated: "It is hereby expressly provided that all water distributed for irrigation purposes shall
attach to and follow the tract of land to which it is applied
.... ,,so The courts have held that this statutory provision requires that, "the water must be attached to the land,"'" and
that, "all appropriations for irrigation purposes since 1895
are inseparably appurtenant to specific land, and so follow
the land to which the water was intended to be and has been
applied." 2 To accomplish the objective of the statute above,
the Nebraska law requires that an application to appropriate
either direct flow or stored water for beneficial use must set
forth the purpose for which the water is to be applied and, "if
for irrigation, a description of the lanfd to be irrigated.""
Since the passage of the Act of 1895, an appropriator may
change the place of use of water appropriated prior to 1895,
but, "can only do so under the permission and subject to the
administrative control of the board of irrigation." 4 This was
held to be, "a valid exercise of state police power, in safeguarding against the possibility of an unjustifiable waste of
public waters and in aiding orderly administration and supervision.""5
The method of making application for use of 'direct flow
and of stored water is set forth in Sections 46-233 through
46-243 of Statutes of Nebraska. The application requirements
for appropriating direct flow for either beneficial use or
storage are very similar to those in Wyoming. However, a
person in Nebraska proposing to apply to beneficial use water
stored must file an application for a permit. 8 A person in
Wyoming proposing to do the same may, but is not required
to, file an application for a permit."' In the case of the North
Platte Project, the Bureau of Reclamation holds permits
from the State of Nebraska to store the water of the North
Platte River in Nebraska. The beneficial users of the project
80. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-122 (Reissue 1960).
81. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation Co. v. Gothenburg Water Power & Irrigation Co., 73 Neb. 223, 102 N.W. 487, 488 (1905).
82. United States v. Tilley, 124 F.2d 850, 856-857 (8th Cir. 1941).
83. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233, -242 (Reissue 1960).
84. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation Co. v. Gothenburg Water Power & Irrigation Co., 73 Neb. 223, 102 N.W. 487, 488 (1905).
85. United States v. Tilley, 124 F.2d 850, 857 (8th Cir. 1941).
86. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-242 (Reissue 1960).
87. WYO. STAT. § 41-27 (1957).
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water must then obtain permits from Nebraska to make use
of the stored water."8
1. Unification Absent the Creationof New Governmental Entities. A solution to the problem as it concerns the
users of the storage water of the North Platte Project would
require a change in the permit so that the right to stored water
could be supplied by Seminoe water with its later priority as
well as Pathfinder water. However, the water law of Nebraska will not allow the necessary change in the permit. Unlike
Wyoming,89 the Nebraska statute which prohibits the transfer of appropriative rights applies to stored water as well as
natural flow." Therefore, the right to stored water from Pathfinder is inseparably appurtenant to the specific land and
cannot be transferred in order to acquire new rights to stored
water from both Pathfinder and Seminoe.9 ' Also, unlike
Wyoming,9 2 the Nebraska statutes do not provide for the
amendment of water permits. Therefore, this method of changing the permit is not open to Nebraska water users. A solution to the problem as it concerns the direct flow appropriators isalso most difficult. In Wyoming, the exchange statute9 3
might be used to overcome the statutory restrictions on the
transfer of appropriative rights to direct flow. But Nebraska has no such statute available to direct flow appropriators.
The restriction on the transfer of water rights which ties
the water to the land in Nebraska is the roadblock to the solution of the problem, and the restrictive statute should be repealed. An advantage of the appropriative doctrine over the
riparian doctrine is that it avoids the freezing of the use of
water to particular lands. This advantage is negated by the
Nebraska restriction on the transfer of water rights, and such
restrictions have been severely criticized as obstacles to the
most efficient and beneficial use of our water resources. It
is maintained that, "If the West is to continue to gain and is
to consolidate its past gains, its water law must allow and
88.

NEB. REV. STAT.

90.

NEB. REV. STAT.

§§ 46-241, -242 (Reissue 1960).

Telephone interview with Department of Water Resources of the State of
Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, April 3, 1967.
89. WYO. STAT. § 41-2 (1957).

§ 46-122 (Reissue 1960).

91. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation Co. v. Gothenburg Water Power & Irrigation Co., 73 Neb. 223, 102 N.W. 487 (1905); United States v. Tilley,
124 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1941).
92. WYO. STAT. § 41-213 (1957).
93. WYO. STAT. §§ 41-5 to -8 (1957).
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encourage water to be shifted to more efficient uses, and to
be used more efficiently in present uses."
It appears that the only method by which the problems
of administering the North Platte River can be met on a person to person basis under existing Nebraska law is to have the
federal government purchase the rights of both the direct
flow appropriators and the beneficial use appropriators of
the stored waters in a manner similar to that recommended
above regarding direct flow appropriators in Wyoming."
2. Unification Based on the Creation of New Governmental Entities. It is possible under existing Nebraska law
to create a reclamation district to integrate the river. This
solution not only circumvents the restriction on the trans,
fer of appropriative rights in Nebraska, but also eliminates
the necessity of the federal government exercising its power
to purchase all of the water rights along the North Platte
River in Nebraska. The reclamation district appears to be
the best solution for the most efficient and beneficial use of
the river under Nebraska law.
In 1947, the legislature of Nebraska passed the Reclamation Act,98 which is substantially the same as the Water
Conservancy Act in Wyoming. 7 The purpose of the reclamation 'districts is to conserve and control water resources of
the state for the prosperity and welfare of the people of Nebraska. 8 Part of the policy of the State of Nebraska, which
is expressly stated in the Reclamation Act, is to:
(2) obtain from water of the state the highest benefit for domestic uses and irrigation of lands in Nebraska, (3) cooperate with the United States under
the federal reclamation laws now or hereinafter enacted and other agencies of the United States government in the construction and financing of works
in the State of Nebraska as herein defined and for
the operation and maintenance thereof ...."
To create a reclamation 'district a petition must be filed in
the office of the Department of Water Resources, signed by
the owners of:
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Trelease & Lee at 8.
See note 56 eupra and accompanying text.
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-501 to -584 (Reissue 1960).
Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-77 to -117 (1957).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-501 (Reissue 1960).
NEB. REy. STAT. § 46-502 (Reissue 1960).
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not less than thirty percent of the acreage of lands
to be included in the district, exclusive of land in
cities and villages ....No district shall be formed...
unless the assessed valuation of land, together with
improvements thereon, within the proposed district,
exclusive of land and improvements thereon in cities
and villages, is two million dollars or more.'
A like petition signed by persons opposed to the district who
have not signed the petition for creating the district. requires the dismissal of the first petition.0 2 The Department
of Water Resources, after the proper steps have been completed, enters orders either creating a district or dismissing
the petition therefor.'
Appeal from the final orders of the
department establishing a district is provided for."4
The 'district, run by an elected board of directors,0
the power:

5

has

(2) To take by appropriation, grant, purchase, bequest, devise, or lease, and to hold and enjoy water
rights... ; to enter into contracts for furnishing water service for use within the district ...; (3) To have
and to exercise the power of eminent domain ... ;
(5) To contract with the government of the United
States or any agency thereof for the construction,
preservation, operation, and maintenance of tunnels,
reservoirs, regulating or reregulating basins, diversion works and canals, dams, power plants, 'drains,
and all necessary works incident thereto, and to acquire rights to the use of water from such works;
enter into contracts for the use of water from such
works to persons and corporations, public and private ...."'
In addition the district has: "power and authority to levy
and collect taxes and special assessments for maintaining and
operating such works and pay the obligations as indebtedness of the district...."1 0 7 In 1950, the Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the constitutionality of the Reclamation Act.' 8
§ 46-516 (Reissue 1960).

100.
101.

NEB. REV. STAT.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-522 (Reissue
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-525 (Reissue
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-528 (Reissue
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-530 (Reissue
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-541 (Reissue
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-542 (Reissue
Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation
41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).

NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-519 (Reissue 1960).

1960).
1960).
1960).
1960).
1960).
1960).
District v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410,
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Under the terms of the Reclamation Act, the reclamation district could acquire all of the rights to Nebraska's share
of the North Platte River as determine'd by the case of Nebraskav. Wyoming. 9 The district would then enter into contracts to furnish water to beneficial users within the district.
This water requirement could be met from any source the
district chose. A contract would be entered into by the district with the Bureau of Reclamation for the use of its storage
facilities and for the delivery of the specific amount of water
needed to meet the water requirements of users within the
district. The water users within the district would, in this
manner, receive their water when they wanted it, and water
could be stored when not needed. At the same time, the Bureau
of Reclamation could take into account the amount of water stored in its reservoirs and the amount of direct flow in
the particular year before determining from which source it
wished to make the water delivery. If for any reason a person did not want his water right to participate in the district,
the district could acquire it through the power of eminent domain."O
One other benefit will be realized by the creation of one
large reclamation district. The bar to the improvement of
the beneficial use of the water that was created by attaching
appropriative rights to the land would be circumvented. The
Reclamation Act gives the board of directors the power: "(4)
To provide for and grant the right, upon terms, to transfer
water service from lands to which water service has been furnished to other lands within the district. ... "" Thus, if a per-

son wished to acquire water, he could purchase a water contract from another to whom the water was less valuable and
condition his purchase on the approval of the transfer by the
district board. The result would be that economic considerations would play a much more dominant role in determining
the uses to which the water resources would be put.
III.

UNIFICATION THROUGH THE USE OF AN

INTERSTATE COMPACT
109. 325 U.S. 589 (1944), modified, by 345 U.S. 981 (1953).
110. The possibility of an action and a decision like United States v. Tilley,
124 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1941) would be eliminated in this way.
111. NEB. Ra-. STAT. § 46-560 (Reissue 1960).
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Assuming that the efficient use of water in the Platte
Basin would be improved through the use of the special district technique in each state, creating in effect two giant parallel districts, it would seem to follow that an integrated administration of the Basin would be even better. There is no
valid reason why an area where rights derive on both sides
of a state line should be denied the best effective solution to
its problems simply because of the chance positioning of an
artificial dividing point. If, in fact, the problems transcend
state lines, so should the solutions. It is necessary, then, to
consider the difficulties inherent in the application of the law
relating to cooperative interstate action.
An agency with the powers of a conservancy district (in
Wyoming).. 2 and a Reclamation district (in Nebraska)"' would integrate administration in the Platte Basin.
Such an agency should be governed by a board made up of representatives from the States of Nebraska and Wyoming and
from the Federal government. The actual number of such representatives and such restrictions as the number necessary
for exercise of the board's powers, how the members are to
be chosen, and where they must be domiciled are questions
for an interstate commission called to draw up such a compact. But, in essence, a diagram of such an agency should
look somewhat like the following:
NEBRASKA

FEDERAL
I GOV'T.

WYOMING

AGENCY BOARD

I

DISTRICT
Since the Federal government is of necessity a party to be
bargained with, it should be represented both at the negotiation meeting and on the Board.
This section will consider the possibilities of creating an
interstate special district for the administration of water
within the Platte Basin. Since the conservancy 'district in
Wyoming and the reclamation district in Nebraska seem to
112. See note 62, supra and accompanying text.
113. See note 96, supra and accompanying text.
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be essentially the same - in terms of powers, duties, and responsibilities, the structure for such a district seems to be
readily available. The essential difficulties which need to be
solved are those involving the integration of the administration (i.e., such questions as who is represented, how they
are represented, and how such representatives are selected)
and the general difficulties inherent in the creation of any interstate agreement.
A. History of the Interstate Compact
The interstate compact has been used as a tool for solving and curing problems which are essentially interstate in
character. Its history can be divided into two distinct phases:
pre-1925 and post-19 2 5 ."4
Prior to 1925, the interstate compact found its greatest
application and use in boundary disputes between states. In
fact, it has been stated that only one such compact prior to
the 1920's did not concern boundary matters in the narrow
sense."1

However, beginning in the 1920's and continuing to the
present time, the interstate compact has been more and more
accepted as a technique for the solution of problems which
transcend state lines and which are not susceptible of solution
on an individual state by state basis. The earliest examples
of these were the Colorado River Compact"" and the New
York Port Authority Compact." 7 Since these landwark efforts, the compact has been used to meet problems of education, 11 8 parole administration,"'

sanitation, 20 oil regula-

2'
tion,' 2 ' fire protection 22 and planning."
114. For pre-1925 use of the compact, the principal work is Frankfurter &
Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution, 34 YALE L.J. 691 (1925).
The principal work for post-1925 history is ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925 (1951) [hereinafter cited as ZIMMERMAN
The bulk of the information in this entire section is derived
& WENDELL].
115.

from ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL.
ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 3-4.

116. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
117. Port of New York Authority Act, 42 Stat. 174 (1921) and amendments
thereto.
118. E.g., Southern Regional Education Compact. For text, see ARK. STATS.
§§ 80-3701 to -3708 (1947).
119. Interstate (Crime) Compact Act, 48 Stat. 909 (1934).
120. E.g., Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
121. E.g., Oil and Gas Compact Act, 49 Stat. 939 (1935).
122. E.g., Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, 63 Stat.
271 (1949).
123. E.g., Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Development District Compact, 64 Stat.
568 (1950) and amendments thereto.
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Indeed, so many compacts have been negotiated since
1925 that a leading text in the field has broken them 'down
into functional areas for descriptive and analytical purposes.1 "4 The authors list five classifications of compacts:
boundary-jurisdictional, boundary-administrative, regionaladministrative,
administrative-exploratory-recommendary,
and administrative-regulatory.'2 5 None of these classifications is an exclusive one; and many compacts have the attributes of more than one of the classifications.
The classification into which the present problem and
proposed solution probably most readily fit is that of the
boundary-administrative compact; although, of course, it has
the possibilities of being somewhat regulatory in nature.
This section will consider some specific examples of the
boundary-administrative compact.'2 6
B.

Problems Inherent in Compacts

The interstate compact is provided for by the Constitution of the United States in the following language: "No
State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State ....
,""' It has
been stated that "the compact clause is the only provision of
the United States Constitution that furnishes a mechanism
for positive cooperation among the states of the Union. It had
emerged, in fact, even before adoption of the Constitution and
was incorporated in it in consequence of established prac-

tice. "12S
Through the years of the use of compacts, certain common procedures have developed for the creation of such a document, 29 which would be applied in consolidating the administration of the Platte River in Wyoming and Nebraska. The
problem transcends state boundaries and is not susceptible of
solution without the joint action of both federal and state governments. These parties would appoint a commissioner or
124.

ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 8-29.
125. Id. at 8.
126. See note 163, infra and text thereafter.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
128. ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 1.
129. See generally, ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, Chapter VI.
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commissioners to negotiate an agreement to be submitted for
the consideration of the Legislatures of Nebraska and Wyoming. If the proposed compact were adopted, it would then
be submitted to Congress and then to the President for approval. If approved, it would be binding on the respective
signatory states.
Problems and differences, however, can arise throughout the general procedure out-lined above. At any stage of
the proceedings, the parties may deviate from the general outline. Such difficulties could involve questions as to whether
the commissioners have power to bind their respective legislatures; as to whether the compact has been entered into when
state legislatures pass acts with different wording; as to whether Congress may amend the compact presented to it; as to
whether, if Congress has power to amend, the states are then
bound by that compact; as to whether the state legislatures
exceeded their authority (under state constitutions) in entering into the particular compact and as to whether a state has
any method whereby it can withdraw from a compact. Each
of these questions involves sub-problems in itself. Since this
is not a comment on interstate compacts as such only the most
general (and frequently occurring) problems will be considered.18 °
One of the most general problems faced by those who
would use an interstate compact is the problem of getting
the states to agree. That problem is a political one and will not
be considered here; however, it is perhaps sufficient to point
out that the benefits to be derived from the joint administration of the Platte Basin are of such a nature that this problem
should not present a serious obstacle.''
Another consideration with which this comment is not
concerned is the determination of whether or not the compact
is one which has to be consented to by Congress and the various intricacies involved in that question.' Some compacts
130. See ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, where these questions and their various intricacies and ramifications are examined at length.
131. As the past governor of Nebraska, the Honorable Frank B. Morris, stated:
"There is no time left, states should stop quibbling with each other and
enter into water compacts which are an essential part of this entire program. That is something to which we should all be dedicated." 30 Reclamation News, No. 1 (Jan. 1966).
132. ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, Chapter II.
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have to be approved and others do not. Under the tests, the
one here proposed does."'8
The two principal considerations which Nebraska and
Wyoming should analyze in any attempt to negotiate an interstate compact are: (1) state constitutional limitations and
(2) Congressional consent. Generally, these seem to be the
recurring problems which face states attempting to create an
interstate compact.
The primary example of the difficulties which can occur
as a result of state constitutional limitations is found in State
ex rel Dyer v. Sims.'8 4 In that case, the State of West Virginia
had entered into the Ohio River Valley Sanitation Compact.' Under the terms of the compact, each state was to
contribute a hare of the expenses. Sims, the state auditor,
refused to honor the warrant to distribute the funds under
the legislative appropriation. As a result, an action for a writ
of mandamus was brought against him. The West Virginia
Supreme Court refused to grant the writ on two state constitutional grounds: (1) that the state constitution forbade the
appropriation of money by the legislature except to meet the
casual debts of the state, and (2) that the state had improperly delegated police power to an agency outside the state and
beyond its control.
This was stated to be (as of 1951) the only example of a
state being blocked from participation in a compact by constitutional difficulties."' To this, two qualifications should
be made. First, the West Virginia Supreme Court decision
was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.' 7 Second,
while unsuccessful, the cases based on constitutional objections have been frequent.
As for the Dyer case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in the
opinion of the Court, maintained that the United States Supreme Court was the arbiter for the federal system and that
it must make the final decision as to the obligations of the
parties to an interstate compact. He then went on to say that
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the West Virginia Con183.
134.
135.
136.
187.

Id. at 122-24.
134 W.Va. 278, 58 S.E.2d 766 (1950).
54 Stat. 762 (1940).
ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, at 96.
State ex rel Dyer v. Sims, 841 U.S. 22 (1951).
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stitution was not the same as that of the West Virginia Court
and that the State Constitution did not prohibit adherence
to the compact. An implication in the decision was that the
Supreme Court would, however, enforce constitutional provisions which obviously prohibited a state's joining in a compact.
Mr. Justice Reed, in a concurring opinion. suggested
that the correct reason for the Court's holding was that the
compact interpretation by the Supreme Court was superior
to state court interpretations of their own constitutions by
reason of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. This has left some confusion as to his position, since it
could either mean that the interpretation was the Supreme
Court's work because of the supremacy clause, or that, because of the approval by Congress, the compact was a federal
law and therefore superior to the state constitutional law by
reason of the supremacy clause. The Court has not reconsidered the question and it has been suggested that it will take
the more moderate view of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the
future."' 9 Should this be the case, the applicability of state
constitutions and the difficulties inherent therein still apply.
Less frequently mentioned areas of state constitutional
objections to interstate compacts, which should be examined
in light of the Wyoming and Nebraska Constitutions, are:
(1) appropriations for the agency did not have a
public purpose; (2) the compact was a special law
granting corporate powers; (3) future legislatures
were bound by the compact; (4) officials were serving in violation of election provisions; (5) officials
were serving in violation of provisions against dual
office holding; (6) expenditures of tax money to outof-state agencies amounted to loaning credit; and (7)
the interstate agency was not a constitutionally authorized political unit.14 °
The principal objection remains that the state police power
cannot be delegated to an interstate agency."' These difficulties emphasize the necessity for careful drafting of the
document.
138. Id. at 32.
139. Tobin, The Interstate Metropolitan District and Cooperative Federalism, 36
TUL. L. Rav. 67, at 79 (1961).
140. Id. at 80 (author's footnotes omitted). In the footnotes, Mr. Tobin lists
several illustrative cases relating to these constitutional objections.
141. Ibid.
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The other principal area of difficulty, particularly in
more recent years, has been the necessity for approval by
Congress. Congress can express its approval at one of two
points in the procedure. It can pass consent-in-advance legislation, in a form which is chosen to persuade the states to
enter into such compacts ;142 or it can approve after the states
have agreed. The first method mentioned has not been common, and in recent years, it has been seen only rarely. The
federal government, through Congress, has taken a keener
interest in its position vis-a-vis the interstate compact.
Two examples of Congressional interest in the compact
and its influence on the agency are Missouri-Illinois Bi-State
Development Agency "' and the reopening of consideration
of the New York Port Authority."
In the case of the Bi-State Development Agency, " Congress refused to grant consent unless the bonds of the Agency
were denied the tax-free status which other state and local
governmental bonds have.14 It might be mentioned in passing that the Bi-State Agency, which perhaps has the broadest powers of any interstate agency, has not lived up to the
early expectations of those persons interested in the field. One
problem has been insufficient financing. "
In the case of the New York Port Authority, the situation was one involving the continuing nature of congressional
consent. It is generally conceded that the consent power of
Congress is not only present at the time of the establishment
of a compact, but also is of a continuing nature.4 8 Congress,
which can consent, can also withdraw its consent. With such
power, it follows politically that it can exact a greater or
142.
143.
144.
145.

As, for example, Interstate (Crime) Compact Act, 48 Stat. 909 (1934).
64 Stat. 568 (1950).
42 Stat. 174 (1921).
64 Stat. 568 (1950) and amendments thereto. See also note 167 infra and
accompanying text.
146. Id. at 571.
147. Tobin, supra note 139, at 75.
148. ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 64. It has also been stated that Congress can
not unilaterally change a compact, but that it can legislate inconsistently
with the provisions of the compact. Letter from Mr. Northcutt Ely, Esq.,
Washington, D.C., to the Honorable Wayne N. Aspinall, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., September 14, 1965. (The letter was in reference to the
Colorado River Compact.)
This would seem to indicate that Congress
could legislate inconsistently, thereby superceding the inconsistent provisions, but leaving the rest of the compact intact, which would be another
type of control.
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lesser amount of control over such agencies, depending on its
feeling at the time.
In 1960, complaints as to the Port Authority's operation reached the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. 49 The Committee determined to investigate the charges and a sub-committee was set up for that
purpose. The Port Authority 's Executive Director refused
to submit the certain records of the Authority to the Committee. The Committee filed an action against the director
for contempt. Hearings were held, which were not favorable
to the authority. The matter of contempt was litigated in U. S.
v. Tobin,' and the director lost. He appealed and the conviction for contempt was reversed,' the court determining
that the resolution creating the sub-committee had not granted it the authority to investigate the documents which the
director had refused to submit."l 2
In the interests of solving the problem presently faced
by the Bureau of Reclamation, Congress should readily grant
the necessary approval for the proposed North Platte Compact. Inclusion of representatives of the federal government
in the negotiation of the compact and its representation in
the administration of the interstate district would assure the
protection of federal interests in the Basin and would probably prevent results such as those which were involved in the
Bi-State and New York Port Authority situations.
A final point relates to the parties and enforcement of
the compact. Nothing prohibits the federal government from
being a party to the compact;... and in recent years, compacts have occurred where the United States was a party.5
Enforcement has been stated to be on the basis of contract.'"
The compact has also been viewed as a treaty between quasi149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

The description of events in this paragraph is from Celler, Congress, Compacts, and Interstate Authorities, 26 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 682, 692-702
(1961).
195 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1961).
United States v. Tobin, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 902 (1962), reversing 195 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1961).
Id. 306 F.2d at 275-276.
ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 59; Tobin, supra note 139, at 90.
E.g., Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31 (1949).
This is as between states. Federal government participation raises other
problems. See ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 47, 64. As to enforcement generally, see ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, Chapter III.
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sovereign entities, but it has been suggested that such an approach has conceptual gaps. 5 '
Generally... the Compact Clause itself provides a
sufficient basis for judicial enforcement, but the
Contract Clause also may be used for this purpose.
In the leading case of Green v. Biddle,'57 Chief
Justice Marshall struck down a state statute because
it was in conflict with a compact, but he did not
even mention the Compact Clause as a basis for his
holding. Instead, he considered the compact to be a
contract between states, and so within the constitutional prohibition of impairment of the obligations
of contract by a state. 5 8
A leading work in the field states that extra-judicial enforcement of compacts is 'desirable.1 59 Such techniques as are
usually contained in a private contract should be used and
the Snake River Compact of 1950.60 is cited as an example
of such a provision. 6 ' There, what may be regarded as an
arbitration provision was written into the compact.
Other possible difficulties, which are present in nearly
every compact, but which seldom occur, are encountered in
state restraints on the intergovernmental agency established.
These restrictions are commonly placed in the compact, but
are rarely enforced. The restrictive powers remain; the lack
of enforcement is simply default by the state. It has been
urged that most such restrictions should be eliminated from
the compacts." 2
C.

Specific Examples

For the purposes of drafting the North Platte Interstate District, two examples are presented here as illustrations of how other states have met problems which are similar
to those presented here, in that their problems, too, transcend
state boundaries. A third illustration is included showing how
Wyoming has solved a similar problem, although it did not
approach the complexities of the problems which are pre156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at

31-32.

8 Wheat. 1 (1823).
ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 47.' Authors' footnotes omitted or renumbered.
Id. at 48-49.
64 Stat. 29 (1950).
ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 48.
Tobin, supra note 189, at 83.
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sently found in the Platte Basin. Nevertheless, the example
does show that states can, when necessary, jointly administer
water use on interstate streams.
The New York Port Authority. Perhaps the most famous of the interstate agencies is the New York Port Authority. 6 ' This interstate agency was created by acts of the
New York" 4 and New Jersey' 65 legislatures and the United
States Congress. 6 Essentially, it is an agency for the administration of most transportation facilities in the metropolitan New York City area.
The compact provides for a board consisting of six members, three from each state. Of these, four (two from each
state) must be from within the district. They are to be chosen according to the laws of their respective states. They can
be removed; and either state is permitted to adopt legislation
providing for the governor's veto of board action.
The Authority, in broad language, is given power to
administer transportation facilities of importance within
the district (e.g., trucking, terminals, bridges). The power
to amend or alter the compact is given the states, with proper
Congressional approval, and the federal government retains
the same right.
The Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Development Agency. 6 '
This agency has to be one of the most interesting, in terms
of powers granted it, of the recent attempts to establish a district involving an interstate metropolitan area. The physical
area of the district consists of six counties, three in Missouri
and three in Illinois, serving the St. Louis, Missouri, metropolitan area.
Originally, the powers of the Bi-State Agency were similar, although broader, than those given the New York Port
Authority. The principal distinguishing feature of the BiState Agency was the broad planning powers given it. These
powers were later expanded, principally in the area of financing;"' the addition also gave the Agency powers to acquire
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

42 Stat. 174 (1921) and amendments thereto
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1921, ch. 154, at 492.
N.J. Laws 1921, ch. 151, at 412.
Supra note 163.
64 Stat. 568 (1950) and amendments thereto.
73 Stat. 582 (1959).
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property, by purchase or eminent domain, "necessary for
the purposes of the Bi-State Development Agency .... ,,1s9
However, Congress placed certain restrictions on the compact. 7 ' None of these significantly restricted powers of the
district. The principal Congressional limitation was in the
area of finance, where Congress provided that "any obligation issued and outstanding, including the income therefrom
S.. shall be subject to tax laws of the United States .... ""'
This distinguishes the treatment of the Agency's bonds from
the typical treatment of similar obligations." 2
The administrative structure of the district is as follows:
each state appoints five commissioners (appointed by the
governor in each case, by and with the consent of the senate
of the respective state). This total of ten commissioners then
makes up the board of the agency. For business, it is necessary
to have three members from each state present and at least
two members from each state must vote for a proposal to make
it valid.
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact. Wyoming is a
member of the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,' as
well as of the Colorado River Compact.' 74 Although the Upper Basin Compact has been feted as a remarkable example
there is a
of what an administrative compact should be,'
particular part of that compact which merits special consideration by Wyoming and Nebraska in solving their interstate problems.
Interstate administration of the use of water is not really
such a new idea. It has been provided for in a limited way
169.
170.
171.
172.

Mo. REV. STAT. § 70.373(6) (1959).
64 Stat. 568 (1950).
Id., at 571.
Tobin, eupra note 139, at 75, states:
Unlike the somewhat narrowly circumscribed Port of New York
Authority, the Bi-State Development Agency (St. Louis-East St. Louis)
has a number of functions accorded to it by compact. This agency has
been given power in regard to transportation, sewerage and drainage

as well as a very comprehensive planning power, thereby standing out
as the interstate metropolitan district with the greatest potential for
development. Unfortunately, fiscal problems have prevented the realization of this potential.
Mr. Tobin suggests that for Congress to single out interstate metropolitan
districts for this kind of treatment is unfair, in

that it

hinders their

competition in the bond market. Id., at 89.
173. 63 Stat. 31 (1949).
174. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
175.

ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL at 14-16.
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in the Upper Basin Compact. 7 ' Article XII of the Compact
provides: "(h) Special water commissioner.-The State
Engineers of the two States (Wyoming and Utah) jointly
shall appoint a Special Water Commissioner who shall have
authority to administer the water in77 both states in accordance with the terms of this Article.'1
Thus in one limited situation, the States of Wyoming and
Utah have provided for the joint administration of the use
of water on a few interstate streams without regard for state
boundaries.
There should be no legal difficulties in reaching an agreement for an interstate district for the joint administration of
certain waters. On a limited scale, it has already been done.
Now is the time to apply the underlying theory of that limited action to a problem which calls for imagination and foresight as well as joint action for its most efficient solution.
IV.

UNIFICATION UNDER FEDERAL RECLAMATION LAW

Prior to 1902, development of water projects was left
almost entirely to private initiative and resources. In that
year, Congress passed the Reclamation Act.1 78 To finance
the projects under the Act, a revolving fund was to be established with moneys received from the sale of public lands.
This fund has long been exhausted, so that present projects
are built with general funds. Although the statute as originally enacted has been amended and supplemented many
times, the basic concepts of the 1902 Act remain.
For the purposes of this comment, Section 8'" of the
original Act merits special attention. It provides:
[N] othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting
or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with
the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used
in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder
and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the
provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity
with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way
176.
177.
178.
179.

63 Stat. 81 (1949), at 40.
Ibid.
32 Stat. 388 (1902), as amended, 48 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1964).
Id., at § 383.
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affect any right of any State or the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of
water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the
waters thereof: Provided, that the right to the use
of water acquire'd under the provisions of this act
shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit
of the right. 8 '
A literal reading of this section gives the impression that the
water right for a reclamation project is an appropriation depending on state law for its existence, that is, the right appears to be like any other state created water right and appears to enjoy no superior federal claim. The Bureau of Reclamation's practice of filing for an appropriation permit in
the state where the proposed project is to be built lends credence to this literal interpretation. In fact, many states have
enacted special legislation providing procedures for the acquisition of a water right by the United States.' 8 '
Under Wyoming law, the State Engineer is given the
power to deny an appropriation if the public interest so demands.'8 2 One instance of this occurred when the Secretary
of the Interior applied to the State Engineer for a permit to
build what is now Glendo dam on the North Platte River for
the irrigation of 40,000 acres of Nebraska land. The first
application was "denied' on the ground that "the proposed
use threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest,"'. 4
and was later issued after negotiations resulted in a modified
application calling for the irrigation of 15,000 acres in Wyoming and only 25,000 acres in Nebraska.' This has been used
to substantiate the literal interpretation of Section 8, that
there is, in effect, a dual control which exists between the
180. 32 Stat. 388, at 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1964).
181. For example, CAL. WATER CODE § 1252.5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-142
(1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-809 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 7933
(1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-2 (1953).
182. Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 23 Wyo. 271, 148 Pac. 1110 (1915).
183. Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People,
States, and Nation, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 158, 200.
184. WYO. STAT. § 41-203 (1957).
185. "Wyoming held the whip hand in another respect. The dam could not be
constructed without modification of the decree dividing the water between
the states. Nebraska v. Wyoming [325 U.S. 589 (1945)] . . . Without
Wyoming's approval of a stipulation modifying the decree, litigation for
a new division of the river might have taken years. The stipulation specifying this division of the stored water is found in Nebraska v. Wyoming,
345 U.S. 981 (1953)." Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 RocKy MT.
L. REV. 464, at 468 n.28 (1960).
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state and the federal government when dealing with a Reclamation water right.'86
However, in 1958, the United States Supreme Court in
Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken8 . provided an intimation of things to come in the interpretation of Section
8. There the Court said that:
[Section] 8... requires the United States to comply
with state law when in the construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary
for it to acquire water rights or vested interests
therein. But the acquisition of water rights must
not be confused with the operation of federal projects .

. .

. We read nothing in § 8 that compels

the United States to deliver water on conditions
imposed by the State. 8 '
Then in 1963, with shattering impact, the Supreme Court
handed down a series of cases, which riddled the literal interpretation theory. The cases of Dugan v. Rank 89 and City
of Fresno v. California9 interpreted Section 8 to mean simply that if the United States infringes upon a vested water
right in the administration of a Reclamation project, the owner's recourse is to sue for damages. The Court refused to enjoin interference with water rights by the United States.
These holdings were extended even further in the landmark decision of Arizona v. California.'9 ' There the Supreme
Court held that the Secretary of the Interior did not have to
follow the law of prior appropriation in the administration of
the Boulder Canyon Project. Although the Court based its decision on the Boulder Canyon Project Act,'92 and not on the
Reclamation Act,9 . the reasoning of the court lends itself
to be used in interpreting Section 8."'
The present effect of Section 8 in unclear. One authority
is of the opinion that so long as Section 8 remains on the
books, the Bureau must obtain an appropriation permit as
186. Id. at 468.

187. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id., at 291-92.
872 U.S. 609 (1963).
372 U.S. 627 (1963).
873 U.S. 546 (1963).
45 Stat. 1057 (1928), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1964).
Supra note 178.
Trelease, supra note 183, at 190-191.
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a condition precedent to construction of a dam for Reclamation storage purposes. However, once the project has been
built, the Bureau has the power to administer the project
in accordance with federal policy." 5
On the other hand, another authority maintains that
Section 8 has no efficacy whatsoever. He suggests that the
Secretary should apply for an appropriation permit, but if
refused, the government can proceed to build the dam without the permit.' It follows that the Bureau can administer
its projects in accordance with its own policy.
Under either view, a consolidation of appropriations
could be made; the Bureau could, under existing Reclamation law, unilaterally administer its projects in the Platte
Basin as a unit. The only limitation on the power seems to
be that the federal government must compensate those whose
property rights are damaged by the governmental action.19 7
Thus, by acquiring the rights of appropriators, whether direct flow, secondary permit, or both, along the Platte River
by condemnation or by taking the right and paying 'damages therefor, the Bureau of Reclamation could unify the
administration of water and operate the Basin as a single
project.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

It appears that the unification of rights on the Platte
River by consolidation is possible under existing law. In neither Nebraska nor Wyoming would new legislation be necessary. Each state presently has laws which could provide a
framework for promoting a fuller utilization of the water in
the North Platte Basin. However, the problem transcends
the Nebraska-Wyoming border, and as a consequence, any
approach by the individual state would not assure the maximum possible development of the Basin.
Nevertheless, there are two possible approaches which
could assure maximum utilization of the water resources of
the area. The first is through unilateral action by the Federal
195. Interview with Dean Frank J. Trelease, College of Law, University of
Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, March 28, 1967.
196. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1, 64 (1966).
197. City of Fresno v. California, supra note 190.
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government under existing Reclamation law. This approach
will not appeal to those who are aware that the problem presented is more than simply a federal one. It has been advocated,1"' by a leading authority in the field of water law, that
where the federal government and state governments face
a mutual problem involving water, the answer lies not in subordinating one interest to the other, but instead lies in mutual planning in which all interested parties have a voice. Such
an approach should assure a policy which reflects both state
and federal interests to the common benefit of all concerned.
This type of consolidated effort is possible through the
negotiation of a compact creating an interstate district
which could administer the Platte Basin as a unit. Through
representation of the States of Nebraska and Wyoming and
of the Federal government at the establishment and in the
actual administration of the district, the maximum utilization of water use in the public interest should be assured.
No matter what approach is adopted to encourage increased development, it must offer the water user security for
his investment. However, this is not to say that such a system should be inflexible; on the contrary, it should be susceptible to modifications which future changes may require.
If these principles are followed, then the ideals of any good
water law, maximum development and public interest, are
most likely to be achieved."'
Finally, it should be restated that the proposal in this
comment is not something to be forced on North Platte
water users. °° It is rather a proposal for a more efficient
use of the water which is presently available in such a way
that all water users should gain by participation. In dry
years, water users will have the advantages of stored waters.
In wet years, water which would otherwise be wasted can be
stored for the dry years. The heavy spring runoff could be
evened out over the year. Predictability of available water
would be improved, and planning could be more efficient for
Trelease, Water Rights of Various Levels of Government-States' Rights
vs. National Powers, 19 Wyo. L.J. 189, 200 (1965).
199. See Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 301 (1957) for a discussion of the requisites of an
ideal water law. See also Trelease, Policies for Water Law, Property,
Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulations, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J.
1 (1965) for related considerations.
200. Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
198.
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all concerned. By adopting such a proposal, the wet-dry cycle,
in all but the longest droughts, could be evened out for the
common benefit of all users on the Platte.
Hopefully, this comment has indicated the more general
problems which exist and some feasable solutions to them.
There are no legal problems which cannot be solved. It is
now for the water users on the Platte River to consider whether they wish to improve their utilization of the waters of
the Platte. If they want to do so, they can. But, after all, in
the last analysis, it is the water user toward whom water plans
must be aimed for all such plans rest on the faith of the water
user in them. The support of the water user is necessary for
any plan to work, no matter how many rules of law and public
policy can be cited as supporting a particular plan.
JOHN MACPHERSON

E. RAGSDALE
Wm~um J. THoMsoN
CALviN
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